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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940276-CA 
v. : 
CLIFFORD W. PERRY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-302 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1990) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
victim's eyewitness identification of defendant was reliable and 
therefore admissible? 
A trial court's decision to admit evidence such as an 
eyewitness identification is a question of law that is reviewed 
under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
782 n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 
1993). However, "a correctness review necessarily incorporates a 
review of the trial court's resolution of factual questions and 
the associated determination of credibility that may underlie the 
decision to admit[,]" which subsidiary findings will be 
overturned only if clearly erroneous. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270. 
2. Was defendant effectively represented by trial 
counsel? 
When reviewed solely upon the trial record, appellate 
review for counsel effectiveness is necessarily conducted de 
novo; however, "[jJudicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must 
be highly deferential." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689 (1984). See also State v. Tennvson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 
App. 1993) ("[d]espite the application of a standard normally 
bereft of deference, appellate review of counsel's performance 
must be highly deferential"). Further, "[i]n cases where a trial 
court has already ruled on an ineffective assistance claim, the 
questions of performance and prejudice are mixed questions of law 
and fact." Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466 (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 698). "Therefore, in a situation where a trial court has 
previously heard a motion based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel, reviewing courts are free to make an independent 
determination of a trial court's conclusions." State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). "The factual findings of the 
trial court, however, shall not be set aside on appeal unless 
clearly erroneous." Id. 
3. Is the evidence sufficient to support the jury 
verdict? 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this 
Court views the evidence and all inferences that reasonably may 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. 
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert. 
2 
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1933). A jury verdict will only be 
reversed where reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 
1989); Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381. 
4. Was the trial court's imposition of the upper 
minimum mandatory term proper? 
Defendant has failed to provide the Court with a record 
adequate to review this issue. Consequently, the Court must 
presume that the record supports the trial court's imposition of 
sentence. State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 7.: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
U.S. Const. Amend VI.: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
As pertinent to the issues, other relevant text of 
constitutional provisions, statutes and rules is contained in the 
body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 
(1990) . 
A jury convicted defendant as charged, following a two-
day trial held on January 12-13, 1994 (R. 136). 
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed 
the upper minimum mandatory term of 15 years to life (R. 211). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 21, 1994, at approximately 11:50 p.m., 
Susan Norton completed her shift as a night manager at a Little 
Caesar's Pizza store in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 447). Before 
going, Norton drove to a Smith's food store located at 2135 South 
900 East to buy dog food (R. 447). Shortly after midnight, as 
Norton returned to her car, she was assaulted by a man with a 
knife (R. 452). Holding the knife to Norton's throat, the 
assailant ordered her to get in the car with him (R. 452-53) . 
The man successfully confined Norton inside the car for 
approximately four minutes before she was able to escape (R. 460-
61). Norton subseguntly identified defendant as the assailant 
(R. 469-70). 
A. Eyewitness Identification 
Upon arriving at the Smith's store that night, Norton 
parked her car four to five feet from a big street-type light in 
the lot (R. 449). She spent approximately ten minutes in the 
store purchasing dog food, and then headed for her car (R. 450). 
4 
As Norton approached the car, she noticed that an older model 
yellow Cadillac had parked next to her, facing her vehicle (R. 
450, 465). Norton further noticed that a man later identified as 
defendant was walking between her car and the Cadillac toward the 
Smith's store (R. 451). Norton did not pay much attention to 
defendant until she realized that he was walking up behind her 
(R. 451). Suddenly, defendant grabbed Norton around the neck and 
told her that he had a knife (R. 452). "[Touching] the blade . . 
. to [her] throat," defendant ordered, "Let's get in the car" (R. 
452-53). 
As Norton got into her car, she could see defendant's 
feet and noticed, in particular, that he wasn't wearing any 
shoes: "He had on -- they were just a pair of white socks" (R. 
454-55). Defendant told her to "slide over" into the passenger 
seat and then climbed in the driver's side, still holding the 
knife in his right hand (R. 455, 457). Norton looked at the side 
of defendant's face for a few seconds, noting that his hair was 
light blonde, and "really curly and kinda messed up, like he 
hadn't combed it" (R. 456-57, 480). Although Norton had no 
specific memory that the car dome light was on at this time, it 
always came on when the door was opened (R. 454). Further, the 
car dome light was operating properly both prior to and after the 
incident (R. 454). 
Once defendant was seated, Norton noticed that his 
knife had a 2" or 3" blade and that he continued to hold it in 
his right hand as he grasped the steering wheel (R. 457). 
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Defendant man demanded Norton's car keys and she handed them 
over, looking directly at three quarters of his face (R. 458, 
461, 480, 500). While the car's interior was "kind of shadowy," 
the parking lot light shone through the windshield (R. 461). 
Norton asked defendant where he was taking her (R. 
459). Apparently referring to the radio music playing, defendant 
replied that Norton had "good taste in music" (R. 459). 
Defendant asked where the car lights were and turned them on (R. 
459). As defendant began to back out of the parking space, 
Norton opened the passenger side door and "tried to jump out of 
the car" (R. 460). Defendant grabbed her ponytail, yanking out 
several strands of hair, and ordered Norton to get back in the 
car (R. 4 60). Norton pushed away from the car and yelled that 
she wasn't going anywhere with him (R. 460). 
B. Additional Witnesses 
Having freed herself, Norton ran toward Scott Buerkle, 
who was loading his groceries into a pickup truck in the next 
aisle over, approximately 40-50 feet away (R. 475, 519, 539). 
Buerkle heard "a man and woman arguing," and looked toward 
Norton's car where he saw 
a woman in the passenger side and a man in 
the driver's side. . . . [T]he passenger 
side door was open, and the woman was trying 
to pull herself away--pull herself out of the 
passenger side and looked like the man had 
ahold [sic] of her hair. 
(R. 519). Buerkle heard Norton yell, "'Help me. I don't know 
this man'" (R. 519). Norton told Buerkle that the man in the car 
was trying to kidnap her, and that he had put a knife to her 
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throat (R. 520). Norton and Buerkle saw the kidnapper get out of 
Norton's car and run toward the yellow Cadillac (R. 464, 521) . 
Buerkle then ran into the Smith's store to call police (R. 526). 
Steve McGregor also witnessed the kidnapping incident. 
McGregor and a co-worker, Preston Fisher had gone to Smith's to 
purchase snacks for their night-shift (R. 542). McGregor waited 
outside in their van while Fisher entered the store (R. 543). 
McGregor watched Norton come out of the Smith's store with the 
dog food (R. 543). He then watched as Buerkle loaded his 
groceries (R. 553). McGregor's attention was drawn back to 
Norton a minute later when he heard her scream, and saw her run 
toward Buerkle (R. 543, 554). 
McGregor ran toward the yellow Cadillac (R. 557). As 
the Cadillac backed away from him, McGregor noticed that its 
lights were off and that it had no front plate (R. 558, 564). 
McGregor and Fisher immediately jumped into their van and 
followed the Cadillac in an attempt to get the license plate 
number (R. 545). The two men never lost sight of the Cadillac as 
it exited the parking lot and proceeded southbound on 900 East 
(R. 572, 579, 588, 568). The van came within two to three feet 
of the Cadillac and Fisher was able to get the license plate 
number at approximately the 33 00 South intersection. Id. 
C. Police Investigation 
1. Eyewitness Accounts 
Police arrived at the Smith's store approximately five 
to ten minutes after the kidnapping incident (R. 468). Norton 
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described her kidnapper to Officer Cyr of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department, as a white male individual in his mid-3 0's (R. 
629). Norton told Officer Cyr that the kidnapper was 
approximately 5'6" to 5'7" tall and weighed approximately 150 
pounds (R. 629). She characterized the kidnapper as small built 
(R. 629). Norton further described her kidnapper's face as clean 
shaven, and his hair as shoulder length,1 curly and blonde (R. 
629). She also noted that he was wearing white socks and no 
shoes (R. 629). Norton told Officer Cyr she was uncertain about 
the color of the kidnapper's shirt or pants, but thought that he 
might have been wearing brown, Docker style slacks (R. 630). 
Although lighting conditions in the parking lot were 
dim, Buerkle reported that he was able to determine that the 
kidnapper was a white male, weighed approximately 160-170 pounds, 
and had blonde or brownish hair with a receding hair line (R. 
522). Buerkle estimated that the kidnapper was approximately 35 
years old and described the kidnapper's car as 1976 or 1977 
yellow Cadillac (R. 521-22). 
McGregor told police the kidnapper was approximately 
30-38 years old, 5'7" tall, 160 pounds and had medium length hair 
(R. 565). McGregor and Fisher described the kidnapper's car as a 
white on yellow Cadillac (R. 567, 580). In following the 
Cadillac out of the parking lot, McGregor noted no major damage, 
observing instead that the Cadillac appeared to be a "real clean 
1
 While the officer's report indicated that Norton had 
described shoulder length hair, Norton recalled describing only 
collar length hair (R. 286). 
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car" (R. 568-69; State's Exh. ##6-7, 17; Defense Exh. ##15-16, 
18) . 
2. Registration Check of Suspect Cadillac 
Police ran a registration check on the license plate 
number reported to them by McGregor and Fisher and found that the 
Cadillac was registered to Shandra Winters (R. 654). Several 
police officers responded to Winters' Salt Lake City address at 
approximately 1:00 a.m., where they observed a yellow Cadillac 
parked outside (R. 631, 661, 668-69) . Defendant answered the 
officers' knock, wearing a towel around his waist (R. 657). 
Officer Cyr noted that defendant substantially matched the 
witness's physical descriptions of the kidnapper except that 
defendant appeared slightly taller, heavier, and his hair a 
little shorter than had been described (R. 632). 
3. Incriminating Evidence Observed in 
Defendant's Living Room 
With defendant's permission, police entered his living 
room where they observed several items spread out on a coffee 
table including a pocket-type knife with an approximate 2" blade 
(R. 633, State's Exh. #9). Officer Cyr also observed defendant's 
shoes and socks and noted particularly that the white socks were 
soiled on the bottom (R. 634, State's Exh. #19). 
4. Defendant's Pre-arrest Statements 
Defendant told the police that he had been at a bar 
earlier in the evening and that he had been the only one driving 
the Cadillac that night (R. 634-35, 670). Police allowed 
defendant to dress himself and then asked him to step outside on 
9 
the porch for an identification procedure (R. 659). Defendant 
responded, "x0h great, I'm going to jail'" (R. 659). 
5. Showup Identification 
Officer Cyr brought Norton to defendant's apartment 
that same night and told her that "he was going to ask [her] to 
identify the person that was there" (R. 468-69) . With Norton 
sitting in the front seat, Officer Cyr drove his patrol vehicle 
"up onto the lawn so that his lights were shining on the person 
who was standing there" (R. 469). Norton noticed that "there was 
another officer standing to the left, (of the suspect) and . . . 
a couple more officers on the other side" (R. 469). Officer Cyr 
asked Norton "if the man standing on the porch [,] who didn't have 
a shirt on, if he was the individual who had attempted to kidnap 
[her]" (R. 469). Norton thought that defendant looked like the 
kidnapper, but asked Officer Cyr to pull closer (R. 469). The 
officer then pulled to within 40 feet of defendant's porch (R. 
469). Norton looked at defendant for an additional 3 0 seconds 
and positively identified him as the kidnapper: "From the front, 
when I was watching him, his hair was the same color and it was 
curly like--probably because it's naturally curly. And he looked 
about the same height and build" (R. 470). 
Following Norton's identification, defendant was 
arrested and charged with aggravated kidnapping (R. 7-8). At the 
time of his arrest, defendant was 5'9" tall, weighed 170 pounds, 
and had collar length blonde hair and a slight blond mustache (R. 
650; Defense Exh. #2). 
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6. Defendant's Post-arrest Statement 
Officer Ziegler of the Salt Lake Police Department 
transported defendant to jail (R. 671-72). On the way, defendant 
made the comment, "That female has nothing on me" (R. 672). 
Officer Ziegler had not personally, nor had he heard any other 
officer tell defendant that the victim was female (R. 673). When 
Officer Ziegler asked the other officers if they had so informed 
defendant, they replied that they had not (R. 673). Officer Cyr 
specifically recalled telling defendant that he was there to 
investigate "a crime" and had not informed defendant that the 
victim was female (R. 675). 
D. Motion to Suppress Denied 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress Norton's 
eyewitness identification on the ground that the identification 
was unreliable and its admission would violate his federal and 
state constitutional rights (R. 27-28) (a copy is attached as 
Addendum A). Following a hearing, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion (R. 347-52), and entered detailed Findings of 
Fact (R. 162-66) (a complete copy of the court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusion of Law is contained in Addendum B). The trial 
court concluded that "defendant's due process rights were not 
violated by the *show up' identification procedure," and 
therefore the victim's identification of him was admissible (R. 
167), see Addendum B. 
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E. Trial Strategy 
Defendant continued to challenge the reliability of the 
victim's eyewitness identification at trial, pointing out alleged 
inconsistencies in the identification. In cross-examining 
Norton, trial counsel2 established that the knife seized from 
defendant's apartment had a broken blade, but that Norton had 
described the knife to police as having a curved or rounded tip 
(R. 502, 515, State's Exh. #9). Trial counsel also challenged 
Norton's description of the assailant's hair, pointing out that 
Officer Cyr's report indicated that Norton had described the 
kidnapper's hair as shoulder length (R. 490). On cross-
examination of Officer Cyr, trial counsel established that while 
Norton had described the kidnapper as possibly wearing brown 
Docker style pants, police had not seized any pants fitting that 
description from defendant's apartment (R. 645). 
Additionally, trial counsel emphasized the fact that 
none of the other witnesses to the kidnapping had been able to 
positively identify defendant as the kidnapper at a police line-
up held approximately two months after the incident (R. 53 7, 
569). Further, trial counsel emphasized that McGregor and Fisher 
had described the suspect Cadillac as having a white top and that 
defendant's Cadillac was solid yellow (R. 568, 580; Defense Exh. 
##15-16, 18) . Defense counsel further brought out that Fisher 
2
 At trial, defendant was represented by Mark Moffat (R. 
16). Moffat withdrew from the case following trial and current 
counsel was appointed (R. 173, 175). 
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had one occasion described the Cadillac as having a dark top (R. 
593) . 
Defendant's only witness was Shandra Winters, who 
claimed ownership of the knife seized from the apartment she 
shared with defendant (R. 690). Winters claimed that she had 
left the knife on the coffee table on September 20, 1993 and that 
as far as she knew the knife remained there until seized by 
police on September 21, 1993 (R. 691). 
F. Motion for New Trial Denied 
Current counsel filed a motion for new trial alleging 
that defendant's trial counsel had provided ineffective 
assistance (R. 189) (a copy is attached as Addendum C). 
A supporting memorandum and accompanying affidavit from defendant 
asserted that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate 
alleged alibi witnesses (R. 191-93, 195-97). Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 232), 
and issued detailed findings (R. 225-30) (a complete copy of the 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law is attached as 
Addendum D). Ultimately, the trial court concluded that there 
was "no error or impropriety" in defendant's trial "which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of defendant[,]" and 
that it "[was] not in the interest of justice to grant defendant 
a new trial" (R. 230), see Addendum D. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted the victim's 
eyewitness identification of defendant based on its determination 
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that the showup identification was reliable under stringent state 
constitutional standards set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1991). Defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
reliability findings fails to demonstrate that the court's ruling 
is without adequate basis in the record. 
Defendant was afforded the effective assistance of 
trial counsel. Defendant's allegations regarding the adequacy of 
trial counsel's investigation was raised below in a motion for 
new trial and expressly rejected. His allegations of 
ineffectiveness on appeal fail to demonstrate any clear error in 
the trial court's factual findings; nor do they demonstrate any 
deficiency in the investigation actually conducted. Moreover, 
defendant wholly fails to explain how trial counsel's alleged 
failure to investigate prejudiced his case. Either failure is 
sufficient ground for the Court to reject defendant's claim. 
Defendant's further complaint that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request a lesser included offense 
instruction on aggravated assault similarly fails. The record is 
replete with indication that an aggravated assault instruction 
did not fit defendant's theory of the case below. Indeed, it was 
contrary to trial counsel's "all or nothing" misidentification 
strategy. Because there is a plausible strategic purpose for 
trial counsel's decision not to request the instruction, that 
decision does not amount to deficient performance. Defendant 
fails to demonstrate that he was unfairly prejudiced as a 
consequence of trial counsel's strategy. Again, the Court may 
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reject defendant's allegation of ineffectiveness on either 
ground. 
There is ample evidence to support the jury verdict. 
Defendant argues that, as a matter of law, he was not able to 
successfully detain the victim for a "substantial period;" thus, 
his conviction for aggravated kidnapping is not justified. 
However, defendant has neither marshalled the evidence supporting 
the jury's determination that the victim was detained for 
purposes of the aggravated kidnapping statute, nor demonstrated 
that it was insufficient to support the jury verdict. Even 
assuming the Court were to read a "substantial period" 
requirement into the aggravated kidnapping statute, defendant's 
confinement of the victim constitutes a substantial, punishable 
offense. 
Finally, the trial court's imposition of a 15 year 
minimum mandatory term is presumptively proper. Defendant has 
failed to provide an adequate record for this Court to review his 
claim of error: Neither the sentencing transcript, nor the pre-
sentence report are included. The incomplete record further 
hampers the Court's ability to determine if the precise issue 
defendant has attempted to raise on appeal was properly preserved 
below. Additionally, defendant's allegation of error fails to 
comply with the briefing rule in that it is devoid of supporting 
legal authority. Based on the foregoing, the Court should reject 





TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE VICTIM'S 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT UNDER 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS STANDARDS 
SET FORTH IN STATE V. RAMIREZ 
In Point I of his brief defendant alleges that the 
victim's eyewitness identification of him shortly after the 
aggravated kidnapping was not reliable and was also unduly 
suggestive under both state and federal constitutional 
provisions. Br. of App. at 11, 17. In State v. Ramirez, the 
Utah Supreme Court set forth a state constitutional analysis for 
determining the "due process reliability of eyewitness 
identifications" which "is certainly as stringent as, if not more 
stringent than, the federal analysis[.]" 817 P.2d 774, 780, 784 
(Utah 1991). The trial court considered the more stringent 
Ramirez analysis in denying defendant's motion to suppress below 
and concluded that the showup identification procedure employed 
by police did not violate defendant's constitutional rights (R. 
167). This Court should affirm the trial court's reliability 
determination. 
A. Ramirez Standard 
Under Ramirez, fl[t]he ultimate question to be 
determined is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, 
the identification was reliable." 817 P.2d at 781; State v. 
Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 658 (Utah App. 1992). To assist that 
determination, the supreme court listed five "pertinent factors" 
by which eyewitness reliability could be determined: 
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(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view 
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's 
degree of attention to the actor at the time 
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the 
witness would perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly. This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary 
one in the mind of the observer during the 
time it was observed, and whether the race of 
the actor was the same as the observer's. 
817 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 p.2d 483, 493 (Utah 
1986) ) . 
B. Trial Court's Ramirez Findings Are 
Supported in The Record 
The trial court considered the foregoing factors in 
determining that "defendant's due process rights were not 
violated by the xshow up' identification procedure" utilized here 
(R. 167), see Addendum B. On appeal, defendant makes no express 
challenge to the trial court's findings under the third or fifth 
prongs of the Ramirez analysis. Br. of App. at 18-20. Rather, 
he challenges the trial court's factual findings under the first, 
second and fourth Ramirez prongs. Br. of App. at 18-20. 
Specifically, defendant challenges the trial court's factual 
findings concerning Norton's opportunity to view defendant during 
the incident; her degree of attention to him; and the consistency 
of her identification and whether it was the product of improper 
suggestion. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. 
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The trial court's factual findings concerning these 
matters are entitled to deference on appeal and may be overturned 
only if clearly erroneous. State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 
1993). "When challenging a trial court's factual findings, xthe 
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against an attack.'" State 
v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State 
v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990)). 
Defendant has not marshalled any evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings. Br. of App. at 8-22. Rather, 
defendant re-argues the evidence presented below in the light 
most favorable to him, leaving it to this Court to sort out the 
evidence supporting the trial court's ruling. State v. Scheel, 
823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1991). Accordingly, this Court must 
reject defendant's allegation of a constitutional violation and 
instead assume the correctness of the trial court's findings to 
the contrary. State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.), 
cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 
(Utah 1993). 
Even assuming defendant's challenge is properly before 
the Court, the trial court's Ramirez findings are based on 
essentially uncontroverted evidence and are well supported in the 
record. 
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1. Opportunity to View 
With regard to the first Ramirez prong, 
pertinent circumstances include the length of 
time the witness viewed the actor; the 
distance between the witness and the actor; 
whether the witness could view the actor's 
face; the lighting or lack of it; whether 
there were distracting noises or activity 
during the observation; and any other 
circumstances affecting the witness's 
opportunity to observe the actor. 
817 P.2d at 782. The record provides ample support for the trial 
court's determination that Norton had sufficient opportunity to 
view defendant (R. 162-167), see Addendum B. Norton estimated 
that she was inside her car with defendant for approximately four 
minutes, during which time she spent approximately 20 seconds 
looking directly at defendant's profile and/or at least three 
quarters of his face (R. 281, 302-03, 311-12) . Specifically, 
Norton looked directly at defendant as he entered the driver's 
seat, and again when he demanded that she hand over her car keys 
(R. 262-63, 302-03). The trial court found that these 
observations were made from as close as two feet (R. 163), see 
Addendum B. 
Although it was nighttime, Norton's car dome light 
likely illuminated defendant as he entered the driver's seat and 
before he shut the driver's side door (R. 262, 277, 280, 297). 
And, while it was "shadowy" inside the car, the parking lot light 
shone through the windshield (R. 297, 306, 461). Id. 
Additionally, Norton viewed defendant outside her car 
as he ran away following her escape (R. 265). From a distance of 
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approximately 30 to 35 feet (R. 283), Norton estimated that 
defendant was approximately 5'7" tall and weighed approximately 
150 to 160 pounds (R. 265). Norton's visual estimation of 
defendant's height and weight corroborated her earlier 
impressions and observations concerning defendant's height and 
weight when he initially pressed up against her back and ordered 
her into the car (R. 275-76, 313). The record is devoid of 
indication that there was any distracting activity, noise or 
other circumstance affecting Norton's opportunity to observe and 
focus upon defendant. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. 
2. Degree of Attention 
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that 
Norton "was distracted during the time she had an opportunity to 
observe the perpetrator's head and face, by considerations such 
as watching the knife in his hand, and trying to escape." Br. of 
App. at 18. This particular assertion was not raised below and 
is therefore waived. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah 
App. 1993) . Defendant has not asserted that there are unusual 
circumstances justifying his failure to present this precise 
ground for suppression. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 
(Utah App. 1991). 
In any event, in considering the second Ramirez prong, 
the trial court found that Norton "observed [defendant] with some 
thought of being able to later identify him" (R. 164). Again, 
the court's finding is well supported in the record. Norton 
received crime prevention training in her work as night manager 
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of a pizza store and looked directly at defendant with the 
specific purpose of remembering him for later identification 
purposes (R. 315). Significantly, the record is devoid of 
indication that any other actor was involved. See Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 783 (noting that victim was able to concentrate on 
defendant, despite the threats and assaultive acts of another 
actor). 
3. Consistency of Identification 
Regarding the fourth Ramirez prong, 
relevant circumstances include the length of 
time that passed between the witness's 
observation at the time of the event and the 
identification of defendant; the witness's 
mental capacity and state of mind at the time 
of the identification; the witness's exposure 
to opinions, descriptions, identifications, 
or other information from other sources; 
instances when the witness or other 
eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify 
defendant; instances when the witness or 
other eyewitnesses gave a description of the 
actor that is inconsistent with defendant; 
and the circumstances under which defendant 
was presented to the witness for 
identification. 
817 P.2d at 783. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the victim's 
eyewitness identification fails under this prong because Norton's 
description of the length of his hair "has not 'remained 
consistent' during the investigation of this case." Br. of App. 
at 18. However, this is not the precise assertion raised below, 
Brown, 856 P.2d at 359-60, and defendant has not asserted that 
there are unusual circumstances justifying his failure to present 
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this precise ground for suppression. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 
922. It is therefore not properly before the Court. Ibid. 
At the suppression hearing below, defendant argued only 
that Norton's initial description of him was inconsistent with 
his actual appearance (R. 343). Rejecting defendant's argument, 
the trial court found that any inconsistencies between Norton's 
description of defendant and his actual appearance were "minor" 
(R. 166), see Addendum B. 
The court's finding is well established in the record. 
Norton consistently described defendant's hair as blonde, curly, 
unkempt and approximately collar length (R. 262, 268, 285-86, 
298). Significantly, trial counsel questioned Norton as to why 
Officer Cyr's report indicated that she had described the 
kidnapper as having shoulder length (R. 285-86) . Norton 
explained she recalled telling the officer that defendant's hair 
was collar length, not shoulder length (R. 286). Norton further 
explained that defendant's hair was " [n]ot real short, wasn't 
[sic] a missionary haircut or anything" (R. 286/ Defense Exh. #2 
(booking photo)). In any event, any difference between Norton's 
initial description of defendant and his actual appearance bears 
on Norton's credibility and on the weight jurors may accord her 
testimony, but does not alone make her identification 
inadmissible. State v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 658 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
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4. No Improper Suggestion 
Finally, defendant claims that the showup 
identification was improperly suggestive because Norton was 
informed that the individual she was being asked to identify 
owned the yellow Cadillac and also matched her description of the 
kidnapper. Br. of App. at 19. Defendant also complains that the 
showup was improperly suggestive because he was the only non-
officer on the porch at the time. Id. 
The trial court determined that there was nothing 
"blatantly suggestive" or "unduly prejudicial" in the manner in 
which the "'show up'" was conducted" (R. 166), see Addendum B. 
Defendant's complaints fail to demonstrate that the trial court's 
finding is without basis in the record. Indeed, the complained 
of circumstances are hardly distinguishable from those in 
Ramirez. As in the present case, Ramirez was "the only person at 
the showup who was not a police officer." 817 P.2d at 784. 
Further, the Ramirez eyewitness was similarly informed that 
police had apprehended someone who fit his description of the 
culprit. Id. The supreme court held that while the foregoing 
circumstances "may not of themselves be unnecessarily suggestive, 
they must be considered as part of the circumstances surrounding 
the identification procedure." Id. Thus, necessarily deferring 
to the trial court's resolution of the factual issues and ability 
to appraise demeanor evidence, the supreme court ultimately 
upheld the Ramirez procedure. Id. 
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If, as defendant claims, the instant showup 
identification is distinguishable from that in Ramirez, it is not 
distinguishable in a manner favorable to defendant. For example, 
Ramirez "stood with his hands cuffed to a chain link fence behind 
his back." 817 P.2d at 784. Defendant, on the other hand, was 
not handcuffed and merely stood on the porch of his own home (R. 
165), see Addendum B. Perhaps more importantly, there were 
racial differences between Ramirez and the eyewitness in that 
case but, Norton and the defendant are of the same racial 
identity (R. 164), see Addendum B. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784 
(noting that "differences in racial characteristics" between 
eyewitness and defendant can raise additional questions about the 
identification). 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly 
determined that Norton's eyewitness identification was reliable. 
Certainly, the instant identification is less problematic than 
that upheld in Ramirez. Considering the totality of the 
circumstances, defendant's complaints simply fail to establish 
that the court's reliability ruling is without adequate record 
support. Id. at 781. Accordingly, the court's admissibility 
ruling should be affirmed.3 
3
 Because the state constitutional standards applied by 
the trial court are more stringent than those set forth in Neil 
v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), there is no need to engage in 
the less rigorous federal constitutional analysis. 
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POINT 1. 
DEFENDANT WAS PROVIDED WITH THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
In Point II of his brief defendant alleges that he was 
denied effective representation by his trial counsel. Br. of 
App. at 23. Defendant bases his claim of ineffective assistance 
on two grounds: 1) trial counsel's alleged failure to 
investigate potential alibi witnesses; and 2) trial counsel's 
failure to request an instruction on the lesser included offense 
of aggravated assault. Defendant's allegations of 
ineffectiveness are not supported by a review of the record; 
rather, he was effectively represented by his trial counsel, Mark 
Moffat, Salt Lake Legal Defender's Office. 
A. Effective Representation Standard 
In determining whether criminal defendants have been 
denied effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment 
right to counsel,4 Utah courts have consistently followed the 
two-part test outlined in the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires 
4
 Defendant has not articulated a separate state 
constitutional analysis of his ineffectiveness claim either in 
the trial court, or on appeal to this Court. Accordingly, the 
State's analysis is limited to consideration of defendant's 
allegations under the sixth amendment. 
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showing that counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 687. Defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of 
the Strickland test. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990); State v. Tennvson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993). 
In order to meet the first part of Strickland, a 
defendant must identify the act or omissions which show that 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 
trial strategy. Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465. Indeed, "this 
[C]ourt will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate 
strategic choices, however flawed those choices might appear in 
retrospect." Id. 
In order to meet the second part of Strickland, a 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
"
xbut for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.'11 Tennyson, 850 P. 2d at 
466 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "A reasonable 
probability is that which is sufficient to undermine the 
confidence in the reliability of the outcome." State v. Tyler, 
850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993). 
B. Trial Counsel Adequately Investigated 
Defendant's Case 
Defendant claims that he told his trial counsel that he 
was at a local bar until 12:30 a.m., on the night of incident and 
that he also "advised his trial counsel of potential alibi 
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witnesses." Br. of App. at 23. He complains that trial counsel 
failed to investigate these witnesses, depriving him of 
"substantial exculpatory information" at trial. Br. of App. at 
26-27. 
Current defense counsel filed a motion for new trial 
alleging the above grounds (R. 189, 191-93, 195-97), see Addendum 
C. An evidentiary hearing was held wherein defendant and his 
trial counsel testified. Upon consideration of that evidence, 
the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 232), expressly 
finding defendant's claims incredible (R. 229), see Addendum D. 
The trial court's findings are supported by the record 
which is devoid of indication that trial counsel failed to 
adequately investigate defendant's case, or that trial counsel's 
decisions were unreasonable. Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188 ("[i]t is 
only after an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can 
make a reasonable decision to call or not to call particular 
witnesses for tactical reasons"). Indeed, trial counsel 
initially directed his investigator to find the alleged bar 
patrons (R. 773). However, when the investigator was unable to 
contact any of the alleged witnesses, trial counsel made the 
determination that the investigator's efforts would be better 
spent locating and investigating the State's eyewitnesses (R. 
773-74). 
Trial counsel's decision was strategic and reasonable 
in light of the fact that defendant told him that he left the bar 
at 11:45 p.m., on the night of the kidnapping which occurred 
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approximately one half hour later at 12:15 p.m. (R. 771-71, 775). 
Thus, as expressly found by the trial court, even if trial 
counsel had been able to locate the bar patrons, and even if the 
bar patrons had been able to place defendant at the bar that 
night, their testimony was simply not exculpatory to defendant 
because "defendant easily could have driven from the location of 
the bar to the location where the offense occurred between 11:45 
p.m. and 12:15 a.m." (R. 229), see Addendum D. See State v. 
Strain, No. 910440-CA, slip op. at 10 (Utah App. November 17, 
1994) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance for failure to 
investigate nonsensical and tangential issues on ground that 
counsel "might have validly determined that trial preparation 
time would be better spent on other avenues more likely to assist 
defendant"). 
As for defendant's complaint that trial counsel did not 
personally attempt to investigate the whereabouts of the alleged 
bar patrons, Br. of App. at 24, the record and defendant's brief 
are devoid of indication how trial counsel's personal attempts 
would have yielded information any different from that obtained 
by the investigator. Cf. Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1255 (trial counsel 
not required to personally investigate crime scene where she 
filed discovery request for all reports and investigations of 
prosecution and was provided with such "because [she] presumably 
obtained the same information as she would have obtained had she 
performed an independent investigation"). 
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The trial court's factual findings rejecting 
defendant's allegation of trial counsel's ineffectiveness are 
entitled to deference on appeal and may be overturned only if 
clearly erroneous. State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 1993). 
See Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186. As the appellant, it is 
defendant's burden to "marshal all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against an attack.'11 State 
v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah App. 1992 (quoting State 
v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990)). 
Defendant has not met his marshalling burden here. 
Rather, relying solely on his own version of his alleged 
discussions with trial counsel, defendant attempts to argue that 
trial counsel failed to investigate substantial exculpatory 
information. Br. of App. at 26-27. Because defendant has not 
properly marshalled the evidence, this Court must reject 
defendant's allegations and instead assume the correctness of the 
trial court's findings to the contrary. State v. Larsen, 828 
P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992), aff'd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993); State v. Scheel, 823 
P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1991). 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's complaints about 
trial counsel's investigation fail to demonstrate any deficiency 
in trial counsel's performance. Moreover, defendant fails to 
articulate any resultant prejudice. Neither the record, nor 
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defendant's brief identify the alleged bar patrons, much less the 
substance of their testimony. State v Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 
593 (Utah App. 1993) (record failed to support Callahan's claim 
of that defense counsel failed to interview and subpoena 
prospective defense witnesses where no indication therein of 
witness's identity and/or their purported testimony). For all 
this Court knows, the alleged witnesses do not exist and, if so, 
may not necessarily testify favorably for defendant. State v. 
Severance, 828 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah App. 1992) (rejecting claim 
of inadequate investigation where record failed to indicate 
whether alleged potential witnesses would have even testified 
favorably for defendant). 
C. Trial Counsel's Consideration of Lesser 
Included Jury Instructions Was Proper 
Relying solely on State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 
1984), defendant claims that his trial counsel was further 
ineffective in failing to request a lesser included offense 
instruction on the specific offense of aggravated assault. Br. 
of App. at 28. However, the aggravated assault instruction did 
not fit defendant's theory of the case below; consequently, his 
second claim of ineffectiveness similarly fails. Butterfield v. 
Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 338 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1991). See Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993) 
(where it is possible to "articulate [a] plausible strategic 
explanation for trial counsel's behavior" ineffectiveness claims 
must fail) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
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Defendant's allegation concerning trial counsel's 
failure to request the aggravated assault instruction is raised 
for the first time on direct appeal without a prior evidentiary 
hearing. Therefore, the Court reviews the claim as a question of 
law. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
However, the Court's review of trial counsel's performance must 
be highly deferential to avoid second-guessing counsel's 
performance ,Mon the basis of an inanimate record.'" Callahan, 
866 P.2d at 593. 
1. No Deficient Performance 
The record on appeal provides no basis to find that 
counsel's failure to request an aggravated assault instruction 
was objectively deficient. Deficient performance does not exist 
unless there is a "'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' for 
counsel's actions," State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah 
App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 
1993), and this Court must presume that trial counsel "made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Brown, fails to 
further his assertion of ineffective assistance in this case. 
While Brown and defendant were both convicted of aggravated 
kidnapping, the similarity between the two cases ends there. 
Brown's trial strategy was to testify that the victim started the 
altercation and that he simply responded to her behavior, thus, 
Brown admitted his culpability for the lesser offense of assault. 
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Id. at 590. On appeal, Brown alleged trial court error for 
failure to give his requested assault instruction. Id. at 589. 
The supreme court agreed with Brown's assertion of 
trial court error, finding that assault was necessarily an 
included offense of kidnapping. Id. at 589-99. The supreme 
court determined that although "[Brown's] testimony may not have 
appeared particularly credible[,]" if believed by the jury, it 
nonetheless established a "'rational basis'" in the evidence for 
a verdict acquitting Brown of kidnapping and convicting him of 
assault. Id. Significantly, because Brown was decided on the 
basis of trial court error, as opposed to trial counsel error, 
the case does not address the legitimacy of alternative 
strategies that are necessarily raised when, as here, trial 
counsel's chosen strategy is challenged. 
In the present case, trial counsel's strategy was to 
attack the reliability of the victim's eyewitness identification, 
not to admit defendant's involvement in a lesser offense like 
aggravated assault (R. 752). Defendant's strategy is apparent in 
his motion to suppress the victim's eyewitness identification (R. 
27-28), opening statement (R. 443), extensive cross-examination 
of the victim and Officer Cyr (R. 471-508, 514-16, 641-50), and 
his closing argument (R. 718-25). Trial counsel challenged the 
both the consistency and the accuracy of the victim's description 
of the kidnapper's hair, height, weight, clothing and knife. 
Ibid. The misidentification approach constitutes a legitimate 
"all or nothing" defense: If the misidentification strategy had 
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created a reasonable doubt that Norton correctly identified 
defendant, defendant would have been acquitted. 
Moreover, trial counsel did request (R. 61), and the 
trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of 
kidnapping (R. 99). Thus, in absence of record evidence to the 
contrary, this Court must presume that trial counsel actively 
considered the various lesser included offense instructions 
available and made a reasonable tactical decision not to request 
an aggravated assault instruction. Cf. State v. Cosev, 873' P.2d 
1177 (Utah App.) (absent showing that trial counsel "failed to 
reasonably participate" in jury selection process, Court rejected 
ineffectiveness claim in favor of "'strong presumption that trial 
counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 
professional judgment'") (citation omitted), cert, denied, 
P.2d (Utah, August 19, 1994). 
In the present case the Court can do more than presume 
that trial counsel considered and reasonably decided against 
requesting an aggravated assault instruction. Indeed, at a 
hearing on trial counsel's motion to withdraw, trial counsel 
expressly noted that to have requested an aggravated assault 
instruction would have been "incompatible" with his primary 
misidentification strategy (R. 752). See Kubat v. Thieret, 867 
F.2d 351, 364-65 (7th Cir.) (no ineffective assistance where 
trial counsel could reasonably have chosen not to submit the a 
lesser included instruction to avoid weakening alibi defense), 
cert, denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989). 
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Further, unlike an aggravated assault instruction, the 
kidnapping instruction given here was not necessarily 
inconsistent with trial counsel's "all or nothing" 
misidentification strategy, and at the same time, afforded the 
jury an opportunity to convict defendant of a lesser offense. By 
requesting the kidnapping instruction, trial counsel was able to 
consistently argue that Norton had misidentified the kidnapper, 
and that the State's evidence was also insufficient to establish 
aggravating circumstances. Even if the jury believed that Norton 
had correctly identified defendant, trial counsel could still 
attack the State's failure to establish aggravating circumstances 
and, on that ground, argue that defendant was at most guilty only 
of kidnapping. Indeed, trial counsel presented this precise 
argument in a motion to dismiss as the close of the State's case-
in-chief (R. 687-88) . Further, trial counsel may have reasoned 
that if he successfully persuaded the jury there were 
insufficient aggravating circumstances to justify an aggravated 
kidnapping verdict, the jury, in its consideration of the lesser 
kidnapping charge, could determine that the three to four minute 
period of detention in this case was too minimal to justify a 
conviction and acquit defendant of that offense as well.5 
5
 Although it was not part of defendant's trial strategy 
below, in Point III of his brief on appeal defendant has attacked 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for 
aggravated kidnapping on the ground that, as a matter of law, the 
period of Ms. Norton's detention was too minimal to constitute 
kidnapping under State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981). See 
Br. of App. at 29-32. The State's refutation of defendant's 
claim is set forth in Point III of this brief. 
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On the other hand, in order for the jury to convict 
defendant of aggravated assault, trial counsel would have had to 
abandon his "all or nothing" misidentification strategy and 
persuade the jury not only that defendant was correctly 
identified as the assailant, but that he had also used a knife. 
Because this scenario is virtually indistinguishable from the 
conduct alleged to constitute aggravated kidnapping, trial 
counsel reasonably decided against requesting the aggravated 
assault instruction. For example, defendant's use of a knife 
constitutes the aggravating circumstance for both aggravated 
assault and aggravated kidnapping. On the facts of this case, 
the only circumstance differentiating the aggravated assault from 
the more egregious aggravated kidnapping offense is the "three to 
four minute" detention immediately following the aggravated 
assault. Accordingly, trial counsel may have legitimately feared 
that the jury, believing his client had threatened Norton with a 
knife, would harbor no sympathy and convict defendant of the more 
egregious offense. 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's assertion of 
ineffectiveness fails to establish any deficiency in trial 
counsel's performance. As recognized in Tennyson, "authority 
from this [C]ourt supports the notion that an ineffective 
assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate 
tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." 850 
P.2d at 468. The record in this case is replete with indications 
that trial counsel's misidentification strategy was well 
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considered. The Court should reject defendant's ineffectiveness 
claim on that ground. Id. at 466. 
2. No Unfair Prejudice 
Defendant has not even attempted to demonstrate that 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a different result had the 
jury been instructed on the lesser aggravated assault offense. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); 
Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1258. This failure is also reason, in and of 
itself, to reject defendant's claim. State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 
1207, 1210 (Utah App. 1991) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim on 
ground that Morgan's "naked assertion11 of error, "without any 
underlying analysis, [fell] far short of [his] burden"). 
Moreover, as evidenced by the verdict, the jury 
believed Norton's uncontradicted testimony concerning defendant's 
identity, his threatening use of the knife, and her three to four 
minute confinement inside the car. See, e.g., State v. Archuleta 
747 P.2d 1019, 1024-25 n.3 (Utah 1987) (where victim's 
uncontradicted testimony established all the elements of rape, 
absent some evidence to support a jury's convicting defendant of 
a lesser included offense, defendant cannot complain that defense 
counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to request 
an instruction on such an offense). Any argument to be made 
concerning the existence of aggravating circumstances (necessary 
to justify an aggravated assault instruction), simply supports 
Norton's credibility. Consequently, the only way defendant can 
show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request 
36 
an aggravated assault instruction is to argue that, as a matter 
of law, his detention of Norton did not last for a sufficient 
period to constitute kidnapping.6 
Even if the Court were to determine that, as a matter 
of law, Norton was not detained long enough to constitute 
aggravated kidnapping, defendant is not entitled to have his 
first degree felony conviction reduced to aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony. Rather, the three to four minute period of 
confinement accomplished here certainly constitutes at least a 
"substantial step" toward the commission of aggravated 
kidnapping. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1994) ("For purposes 
of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for 
the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting 
a substantial step toward commission of the offense"). As 
defendant does not dispute that the elements of aggravated 
kidnapping are otherwise established by the uncontradicted 
testimony of the victim,7 he is at most entitled to entry of a 
conviction for attempted aggravated kidnapping, a second degree 
felony. 
See n.5, supra. 
See Point III, infra. 
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED 
KIDNAPPING 
Relying solely on State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 
1981) defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Br. of App. at 
29. The crux of defendant's Couch argument is that the period of 
detention in this case is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
constitute kidnapping. Br. of App. at 29-32. Defendant's 
reliance on Couch is misplaced and fails to support his claim. 
In State v. Couch, the Utah Supreme Court considered a 
similar sufficiency challenge to a conviction for kidnapping. 
635 P.2d at 92. Defendant Couch offered to drive the victim and 
two of her friends home in the victim's car. After dropping off 
the victim's friends, Couch drove by the victim's home without 
stopping. The victim protested but Couch continued driving for 
some distance. Eventually, Couch turned off the freeway and 
stopped in a deserted place where he sexually assaulted the 
victim. Couch then drove the victim to a nearby town where he 
got out at a motel, leaving the victim to drive herself home. 
Id. at 91-92. 
On appeal, Couch argued that his detention of the 
victim was "merely incidental to the crime of aggravated sexual 
assault and in effect a lesser included offense that should not 
be the basis for a separate conviction." Id. at 92. In 
considering Couch's claim, the supreme court recognized a general 
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concern with kidnapping statutes that do not specify the duration 
of time or the circumstances under which a victim must be 
detained for a kidnap to occur. Id. at 92. The supreme court 
noted that a "literal application of such statutes could 
transform virtually every rape and robbery into a kidnapping as 
well." Id. Indeed, the court noted that a "defendant convicted 
of both kidnapping and what can be termed a 'host crime' would in 
many cases receive a significantly heavier sentence than if only 
the host crime had been charged." Id. 
In contrast, the supreme court noted that Utah's 
kidnapping statute "expressly limits the circumstances under 
which a detention will constitute kidnapping." Id.8 The 
supreme court interpreted Utah's statute as requiring 
satisfaction of one or the other conditions: Either the victim 
must be held for a "substantial period," or, the circumstances of 
the detention must expose the victim to risk of serious bodily 
8
 Then, as now, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1990) 
provides: 
(1) A person commits kidnapping when he 
intentionally or knowingly and without 
authority of law and against the will of the 
victim: 
(a) Detains or restrains another for any 
substantial period; or 
(b) Detains or restrains another in 
circumstances exposing him to risk of serious 
bodily injury; . . . 
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injury. Id. at 93. In determining what constitutes a 
"substantial period," the supreme court expressly noted that it 
"can be defined only by reference to a specific fact situation," 
but that "a period of detention longer than the minimum inherent 
in the commission of a rape or a robbery" is required. Id. The 
supreme court found that Couch's conviction was sustainable under 
either theory because, "the kidnapping was not merely incidental 
or subsidiary to some other crime, but was an independent, 
separately punishable offense." Id. 
The instant facts similarly support defendant's 
conviction for aggravated kidnapping. This is not a case where 
the kidnapping incidentally facilitated a "host crime," thereby 
exposing defendant to the risk of a "cumulative penalty." Couch 
at 92-93. Rather, the aggravated assault in this case was 
completed and in fact made possible defendant's subsequent and 
independent act of kidnap. Specifically, defendant grabbed 
Norton from behind, and touched the blade of his knife to her 
throat (R. 452). Defendant then ordered, "Let's get in the car" 
(R. 452-53). Such conduct clearly constitutes aggravated 
assault.9 Evidence of Norton's detention beyond this point adds 
9
 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990): 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-
102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force 
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nothing to the completed aggravated assault but rather, 
constitutes aggravated kidnapping. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
302(1)(c) (1990) ("A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the 
person intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law and 
against the will of the victim, by any means, and in any manner, 
seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim with intent: 
. . . To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or 
another [.]").10 
Indeed, defendant forced Norton into her car and 
ordered her to "slide over" into the passenger seat (R. 454-57). 
He then climbed in the driver's side door, holding the knife in 
his right hand (R. 455-57). Once inside the car, defendant 
continued to hold the knife and demanded Norton's car keys (R. 
457-58). Norton handed over the keys and asked where defendant 
he was taking her (R. 459). Defendant replied only that she had 
"good taste in music" (R. 459). He then asked where the car 
likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (1994) defines 
an assault as 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes or creates a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
10
 Defendant was charged, and the jury instructed under 
section 76-5-301(1)(c) (R. 7-8, 95,97). 
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lights were, and following Norton's direction, turned them on (R. 
459). Defendant proceeded to put the car into reverse and to 
back out of the parking space (R. 460). At this point, Norton 
opened the passenger door and "tried to jump out of the car" (R. 
460). Defendant grabbed Norton's ponytail, loosening her 
barrette and yanking out several strands of hair (R. 460). 
Defendant ordered Norton to get back in the car, but she pushed 
away, yelling that she was not going anywhere with defendant (R. 
460) . 
Defendant does not dispute that Norton was confined for 
purposes of the section 76-5-302. Nor does he dispute that he 
intended to inflict bodily injury and/or to terrorize Norton. 
Rather, his sole argument on appeal is that the period of 
detention in this case, which he claims to be approximately 2 0 
seconds, is insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify his 
conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Br. of App. at 30. 
Defendant's claim regarding the significance and 
precise length of Norton's confinement is raised for the first 
time on appeal11 and is not supported by the record. Norton 
testified that the entire incident lasted approximately five 
minutes and that defendant held her inside the car for three to 
four minutes before she attempted to escape (R. 466, 510). She 
further testified that during that time, she spent approximately 
20 seconds looking at defendant's face with the purpose of 
identifying him later (R. 461-63). Defendant wholly fails to 
11
 See n.5, supra. 
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recognize this uncontradicted evidence, let alone demonstrate 
that it is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. He has 
instead, argued the evidence in the light most favorable to his 
position. This Court is justified in rejecting defendant's 
sufficiency challenge on that ground alone. State v. Scheel, 823 
P.2d 470, 473 (UtahApp. 1991). 
Further, there is no express requirement in the 
aggravated kidnapping statute that the victim be detained for a 
"substantial period." Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-301 with 
76-5-302. Even assuming such a requirement were to be read into 
section 76-5-302, the length of Norton's detention was in fact 
"longer than the minimum inherent" in the commission of the 
aggravated assault. Couch, 635 P.2d at 93. Indeed, the 
kidnapping arguably began simultaneously with the aggravated 
assault, outside Norton's car. When the aggravated assault was 
completed, the kidnapping continued when defendant forced and 
held Norton inside her car for another three to four minutes, or 
until Norton's fortuitous escape. Thus, even under Couch, 
Norton's confinement was neither incidental nor subsidiary to the 
preceding aggravated assault. Couch, 635 P.2d at 93. Rather her 
further confinement inside the car constitutes an "independent, 
separately punishable offense." Id. This Court should affirm 
the jury's verdict. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF A 15 YEAR 
MINIMUM MANDATORY TERM IS PRESUMPTIVELY 
PROPER 
Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 
(1990). Aggravated kidnapping is punishable by imprisonment for 
a minimum mandatory term of five, ten or 15 years and which may 
be for life. Section 76-5-302(3). Following a sentencing 
hearing, the trial court imposed the 15 year minimum mandatory 
term (R. 211), finding: 
1. That defendant has established instances 
of repetitive criminal conduct. 
2. That defendant's criminal conduct has 
escalated from those against property to 
those against the person. 
3. That the victim was particularly 
vulnerable as she was approached from behind, 
at night, while she was in the process of 
placing groceries in her motor vehicle. 
4. That defendant was armed with a dangerous 
weapon which he held to the throat of the 
victim. 
5. That defendant continues to deny any 
involvement in the crime even in the face of 
abundant, credible evidence. 
(R. 209-10) (a complete copy is attached as Addendum E). 
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred, 
as a matter of law, in finding that the victim in this case was 
"vulnerable" for sentencing purposes and argues that he is 
thereby entitled to re-sentencing "at the mid-range level of ten 
years." Br. of App. at 32-35. However, defendant has neither 
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provided the Court with an adequate record, nor appropriately 
briefed the issue on appeal. Consequently, the issue is not 
properly before the Court. 
1. Failure to Provide an Adequate Record 
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of 
Law indicates that the court relied upon the parties' arguments, 
defendant's statements, a pre-sentence report, statutory 
guidelines and the record of the case in fashioning defendant's 
sentence (R. 209), see Addendum E. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
(Supp. 1994) .12 Defendant has failed to provide this Court with 
either a transcript of the sentencing hearing, or a copy of the 
pre-sentence report. Consequently, the record before the Court 
is inadequate to address the issue defendant has attempted to 
raise on appeal. 
Defendant, as the appellant, "has the burden when 
raising objections on appeal to see that the record contains the 
materials necessary to support his appeal." State v. Theison, 
709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985). Because this Court "cannot 
speculate on the existence of facts that do not appear in the 
Section 76-3-201 (6) (c) provides: 
In determining whether there are 
circumstances that justify imposition of the 
highest or lowest term, the court may 
consider the record in the case, the 
probation officer's report, other reports, 
including reports received under Section 76-
3-404, statements in aggravation or 
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or 
the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
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record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action 
of the trial court." Id. Indeed, the trial court fulfilled its 
statutory obligation by setting forth on the record, the facts 
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper minimum mandatory 
term. Section 76-3-201(6)(d).13 Accordingly, in the absence of 
record evidence to the contrary, the Court must "presume the 
trial court acted correctly" in imposing the 15 year minimum 
mandatory period. Theison, 709 P.2d at 309. 
2• Waiver 
The missing record further hampers the Court's ability 
to determine if this issue was properly preserved below. It is 
simply not possible, based on the record before the Court, to 
determine precisely what arguments were presented to the trial 
court at the sentencing hearing. Neither party filed sentencing 
memorandum with the court. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(6) (b) .14 
"Generally, a defendant who fails to bring an issue 
before the trial court is barred from asserting it initially on 
appeal." State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 
Section 76-3-201 (6) (d) provides: 
The court shall set forth on the record the 
facts supporting and reasons for imposing 
the upper or lower term. 
Section 76-3-201 (6) (b) provides: 
Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either 
party may submit a statement identifying 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. 
46 
1991). A "general objection" to a trial court's imposition of 
sentence is insufficient to preserve issues for appeal. State v. 
Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991). The requirement of a 
specific objection on the record is necessary to ensure "that the 
trial court will have an opportunity to correct any errors," and 
to assure "that the appellate court will have a record of the 
grounds asserted below." Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 
(Utah 1989) . 
3. Failure to Adequately Brief Issue 
Finally, this Court should decline to consider this 
issue because defendant's brief fails to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Utah R. App. 24 (j) ("[b]riefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court"). 
See also State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah App. 1992) 
(refusing to consider Price's argument on appeal due to non-
compliance with rule 24). As noted previously, defendant fails 
to demonstrate where in the record this issue was preserved 
below. Utah R. App. 24(a)(5).15 Further, defendant's assertion 
of trial court error is devoid of supporting legal authority. 
Rule 24(a)(5)(A)-(B) requires: 
citation to the record showing that the issue 
was preserved in the trial court; or a 
statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court. 
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Utah R. App. 24 (a) (9) .16 See Price, 827 P.2d at 249-50/ State 
v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to reach 
merits of issue on appeal due to inadequate factual and legal 
analysis). 
CONCLUSION 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CLIFFORD W. PERRY, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
Case No. 931901556FS 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
The defendant, CLIFFORD PERRY, by and through his 
attorney of record, MARK R. MOFFAT, moves the court to suppress 
statements of Susan Norton relating to her identification of 
Clifford Perry as the suspect in this case. Mr. Perry submits that 
the "show up" identification procedure employed by the police on 
September 21, 1993 at 4333 South Rose Garden Lane was unduly 
suggestive and unreliable. Any subsequent identification, 
including any in-court identification, is necessarily tainted and 
is thus inadmissible. Ms. Norton's in-court identification of 
defendant would be violative of Mr. Perry's due process rights as 
guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the 
0000-2-?'IJ 
Utah Constitution. See Neil v. Bioaers. 409 U.S. 188 (1972) ; State 
v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
DATED this ^ day of December, 1993. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of 
the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
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Salt Lake County Attorney 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, Bar No. 4931 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSION OF LAW 
-vs- ' 
Case No. 931901556FS 
CLIFFORD W. PERRY, ' 
» Hon. Frank G. Noel 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification, 
filed in the above-entitled matter, came on for hearing before 
the Court on January 12, 1994, at 8:30 a.m.. Defendant was 
present and represented by counsel, Mark R. Moffat, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, and the State of Utah was represented 
by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. 
In his Motion, defendant alleges the "show up" 
identification procedure employed by the Salt Lake City Police, 
on the night of the crime and shortly after his arrest, was 
unduly suggestive and unreliable. Defendant claims any 
subsequent identification, including any in-court identification, 
is necessarily tainted and inadmissible thus violating his due 
process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and FourtQft&J 6nt^ WeYiliii' 5 
Tt'.irc'J;c<c.vD<z.r.ct 
By. 
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to the United States Constitution in addition to Article I 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Testimony was received from 
Susan Norton and Officer Joseph Cyr, Salt Lake City Police 
Department. 
The case was argued by counsel and submitted to the Court. 
Being fully advised in the premises the Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant was charged by Information with 
Aggravated Kidnapping, a First Degree Felony. 
2. That shortly after midnight on September 21, 1993, Susan 
Norton was shopping at Smith's Food King, 2135 South 900 East, 
Salt Lake City. 
3. That Ms. Norton's automobile was parked in the Smith's 
lot within five feet of one of the outdoor lights used to 
illuminate the parking lot. 
4. That as Ms. Norton was entering her automobile after 
shopping, a male approached her from behind and held a knife to 
her throat. 
5. That the male ordered Ms. Norton to enter her automobile 
from the driver's side. 
0 0 0 | 6 2 000U7 
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6. That the male ordered Ms. Norton to slide over to the 
passenger seat and then the former placed himself in the driver's 
seat. 
7. That the male ordered Ms. Norton to give him the 
ignition keys. 
8. That the male started the engine and commented on Ms. 
Norton's choice in music as the radio came on when the automobile 
started. 
9. That the male asked Ms. Norton where the automobile 
headlight switch was located. 
10. That the male turned on the automobile's headlights and 
placed the gears in reverse. 
11. That as the male began backing out of the parking place, 
Ms. Norton opened the passenger door and tried to exit. 
12. That the male grabbed Ms. Norton by her hair and 
attempted to keep her in the automobile. 
13. That Ms. Norton was able to break free from the male. 
14. That Ms. Norton ran away from her automobile and 
enlisted the help of another individual who had also been 
shopping. 
15. That while in her automobile with the male who had the 
knife, Ms. Norton was sitting within two feet of that male. 
16. That Ms. Norton's automobile was su0gcQdi^^r^TlU^|t^^ 
for her to see the male's features. 
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17. That Ms. Norton was afraid but not so terrified as not 
to observe the male's features. 
18. That Ms. Norton observed the male from profile and 
three-quarters view. 
19. That Ms. Norton observed the male for a total period of 
ten to twenty seconds while the former was in her automobile. 
20. That Ms. Norton observed the male with some thought of 
being able to later identify him. 
21. That Ms. Norton stated the male was wearing white socks 
and no shoes. 
22. That Ms. Norton identified the male as being a member of 
the Caucasian race, the same race as Ms. Norton. 
23. That Ms. Norton was seated in her automobile with the 
male for at least one minute. 
24. That Ms. Norton had no problems with her vision and was 
able to see clearly. 
25. That after Ms. Norton broke away from the male, the 
latter exited her automobile and entered an older, yellow 
Cadillac which had been parked in front of Ms. Norton's 
automobile. 
26. That the male drove away in the yellow Cadillac. 
27. That others in the parking lot observed Ms. Norton break 
away from the male and heard her screamsQQft I r i fiflfi If (j 
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28. That two individuals in the parking lot, who had 
observed what happened, followed the yellow Cadillac and obtained 
its license plate number. 
29. That the address of the Cadillac's registered owner was 
ascertained. 
30. That Salt Lake City Police Officers responded to the 
registered owner's address less than two hours after the above-
described incident and discovered the yellow Cadillac nearby. 
31. That the police made contact with a male within the home 
who generally >atched the description of the male who had been in 
Norton's automobile. 
32. That there was evidence within the home which indicated 
the male was the individual who drove away from Smith's in the 
yellow Cadillac. 
33. That the male suspect was escorted outside of the home 
by the police. 
34. That the male suspect, defendant Clifford W. Perry, was 
not handcuffed when he was taken outside of the home. 
35. That at least two police officers were next to defendant 
when he was outside of the home. 
36. That Ms. Norton was seated in the front passenger seat 
of Officer Joseph Cyr's police vehicle. 
37. That Officer Cyr asked Ms. Norton to lookft gtrj tilA fr»*^ r> 
he would illuminate and see if she recognized him. 
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38. That Officer Cyr drove Ms. Norton to within 
approximately eighty feet of defendant. 
39. That Officer Cyr trained his vehicle's spotlight and 
high beam headlights on defendant. 
40. That Ms. Norton told Officer Cyr that defendant appeared 
to be the male who had forced her into her automobile. 
41. That Officer Cyr drove closer to defendant stopping at a 
distance of approximately forty feet. 
42. That Ms. Norton then told Officer Cyr that she was 
positive defendant was the male who had forced her into her 
automobile. 
43. That defendant was subsequently arrested. 
44. That there was nothing blatantly suggestive in the 
manner in which the "show up" was conducted. 
45. That there was nothing unduly prejudicial in the manner 
in which the "show up" was conducted. 
46. That there were only minor inconsistencies in the way 
Ms. Norton described the male while she was still at the Smith's 
Food King parking lot and the actual description of defendant as 
he appeared at the "show up11. 
47. That Ms. Norton had sufficient prior opportunity to 
observe and identify defendant independent of the "show up" 
identification. 0 0 0 1 6 6 O O Q i S I 
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CONCLUSION OF LAW; 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes, as a matter of law, that the defendant's due process 
rights were not violated by the "show up" identification 
procedure employed by the police. 
DATED this ^ *~ day of 
Approved as to form: 
Mark R. Moffat 
Attorney for Defendant 
THE HONOI 
Third District Court Judge 
000/67 000152 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusion Of Law and Order were 
mailed to Mark R. Moffat, Attorney for Defendant Clifford W. 
Perry, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 on the ^ V.-^May of January, 1994. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
-VS- Case No. 931901556FS 
CLIFFORD W. PERRY, 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT TO THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED ACTION, by and through his 
counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, hereby moves and petitions the 
above court to grant the defendant a new trial in this action. 
This motion is made to the court pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
IN SUPPORT OF THIS MOTION, defendant relies upon his 
memorandum of points and authorities and his affidavit filed in 
conjunction herewith. 
ooouft.'>;9-
DATED THIS Z>\ day of A p r ! 1 , 1994 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY" C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVEfiY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused 
the foregoing MOTION, to be served upon plaintiff by hand-
delivering a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope 
addressed to: 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 






MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 TO 
K 6ALT LAKE COUNTY 
Lt^Uty Cidik 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CLIFFORD W. PERRY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 931901556FS 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
DEFENDANT TO THE ABOVE-CAPTION, by and through counsel his 
counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, hereby submits the following 
as his memorandum of points and authorities in support of his 
motion for a new trial. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
1. Defendant was tried in this matter in January 1994. He 
was convicted by a jury verdict of guilty on January 13, 1994. 
2. Defendant's former counsel in this case was Mr. Mark 
Moffat of the Legal Defender's Association. 
3. Defendant advised Mr. Moffat of substantArtn<^<tej}qe 
which would tend to be exculpatory of the defendant in this action, 
including the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the offense, 
and two alibi witnesses who would testify in behalf of the 
defendant, 
4. Defendant's counsel failed to investigate this 
information and failed to present this information to the court as 
a defense in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant is not only entitled to the appointment of 
counsel to represent him in this case, he is entitled to effective 
assistance of that counsel. State of Utah v. Carter, 233 U.A.R. 18 
(Utah, 1994). To prevail n a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must show that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner which fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and that 
counsel's performance prejudiced defendant. State v. Germanto. 226 
U.A.R. 3 (Utah, November 15, 1993.) 
Defendant did not have effective assistance of counsel during 
the trial, in that the defendant gave substantial exculpatory 
information to counsel, which was not investigated and which was 
not presented to the jury. Failure to investigate an alibi is 
clearly both below a standard of performance for a defense counsel 
and prejudice to defendant. 
DMOJISE 
2 
The failure of defense counsel to consider, investigate and 
present significant exculpatory evidence to the jury at the time of 
trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Because of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant is entitled to a 
new trial in this action, as prayed in his motion. 
DATED THIS / day of ftpf'\ 1 , 1994. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY^C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant 
ooffrmj 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM, to be served upon plaintiff by hand-
delivering a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope 
addressed to: 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the _J day of ^ A A , 1994. 
ljlt LKjJJ* 
Secretary 
000198 JOG "' 0 4 
ADDENDUM D 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, Bar No. 4931 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff, ) OF LAW 
-vs- ' 
Case No. 93190155fFS 
CLIFFORD W. PERRY, } 
, Hon. Frank G. Noe± 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion For New Trial, filed in the above-
entitled matter, came on for hearing before the Court on May 10, 
1994, at 3:00 p.m.. Defendant was present and represented by 
counsel, Mary C. Corporon, Corporon and Williams, and the State 
of Utah was represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy Salt Lake 
County Attorney. Testimony was received from defendant and Mark 
R. Moffat, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. 
The Motion was argued by counsel and submitted to the Court. 
Being fully advised in the premises the Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law: 
000221, -Q02:0 
T» " i .\-? c o 2»strict 
J3T? 7 19S4 
~ " ' « • * " -
Deputy Clerk 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant was charged by Information with Aggravated 
Kidnapping, a First Degree Felony. 
2. That defendant was tried before a jury on January 12-13, 
1994, and found guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping. 
3. That Mark R. Moffat, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, represented defendant at trial. 
4. That subsequent to the trial, defendant dismissed Mr. 
Moffat. 
5. That on January 21, 1994, defendant, acting pro se, 
filed a handwritten Motion For New Trial. 
6. That defendant's January 21, 1994 Motion was based on: 
(a) "That the statute that the said defendant was 
convicted of was not based upon the facts of the trial and that 
there should have been a lessor (sic) offense for the jury to 
have considered. ..." 
(b) That because a jury in a capital case consists of 
twelve members, it was error that defendant's jury only consisted 
of eight members. 
(c) That the identification process at arrest, pretrial 
and trial was, "suggestive, coerced and pre-judice (sic).11 
(d) That potential jury members heard witnesses 
conversing about defendant which may have tainte 
and biased them against defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
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7. That in its Minute Entry of January 28, 1994, the Court 
addressed the January 21, 1994 Motion, point-by-point, and denied 
the same. 
8. That subsequent to the denial of defendant's January 21, 
1994 Motion, Mary C. Corporon was appointed counsel for 
defendant. 
9. That on April 1, 1994, Ms. Corporon filed a second 
Motion For New Trial based on the claims in defendant's Affidavit 
filed with the Motion. 
10. That, in his Affidavit, defendant claims: 
(a) That he had been in a bar until approximately 12:30 
a.m., which was after the offense had been committed. 
(b) That several alibi witnesses could place him in the 
bar until 12:30 a.m.. 
(c) That Mr. Moffat neither investigated his alibi nor 
presented it to the jury. 
(d) That he had loaned the keys to his motor vehicle to 
a fellow patron of the bar at some time between 11:00 p.m. and 
11:30 p.m. 
(e) That the individual to whom he loaned his motor 
vehicle matched the description of the assailant as given by the 
victim. 
(f) That he was present in the ba£ ffe*> & p « Trtire the 
offense occurred. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
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(g) That his motor vehicle was not present at the bar 
at the time the offense occurred. 
(h) That he has a very pronounced southern accent, the 
assailant had no accent and neither did the bar patron to whom he 
loaned his motor vehicle. 
11. That, at the Hearing on the instant Motion, Mr. Moffat 
testified: 
(a) That, during preparation for trial, defendant told 
Mr. Moffat the former departed the bar in his motor vehicle at 
approximately 11:45 p.m.. 
(b) That defendant told Mr. Moffat he had witnesses 
which could place him in the bar the evening the offense 
occurred. 
(c) That defendant told Mr. Moffat he was driving his 
motor vehicle in the vicinity of the location the offense 
occurred. 
(d) That defendant never told Mr. Moffat he had loaned 
his motor vehicle to another bar patron, prior to the time the 
offense occurred, nor the name of that patron. 
(e) That Mr. Moffat directed his investigator to 
concentrate the investigator's efforts on plaintiff's witnesses 
and their written statements because defendant bflcfl (fc^ ffijf M r -
Otjvzirj 
Moffat he drove his motor vehicle away from the bar approximately 
one-half hour before the offense occurred. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
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(f) That because of defendant's statements to Mr. 
Moffat, witnesses at the bar could only place defendant thereat 
until 11:45 p.m., and any testimony by these witnesses would not 
be helpful to defendant at trial. 
12. That, at the jury trial, witnesses testified: 
(a) That the offense occurred at approximately 12:15 
a.m. . 
(b) That the assailant drove away from the location, 
where the offense occurred, in an older Cadillac. 
(c) That the Cadillac's license plate number was 
reported to the police. 
(d) That the victim provided the police with a 
description of the assailant. 
(e) That, on his feet, the assailant was wearing white 
socks only. 
(f) That the police determined the location of the 
older Cadillac bearing the reported license plate number and 
which was parked next to the home in which defendant was located. 
(g) That the police made contact with defendant who 
generally matched the description given by the victim. 
(h) That white socks, which appeared to have road dirt 
on the soles, was discovered among defendant's clothing. 
(i) That defendant made incriminating s t ^ f f n % 9 ffibout 
going to jail, before he was arrested, and that the victim was a 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
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woman without being told the victim was female or having seen the 
victim. 
(j) That the victim identified defendant as her 
assailant in a "show up." 
(k) That defendant told the police he was the only 
person who drove the older Cadillac that evening". 
13. That defendant easily could have driven from the 
location of the bar to the location where the offense occurred 
between 11:45 p.m. and 12:15 a.m.. 
14. That, upon his arrest, defendant did not tell the 
police he had loaned his motor vehicle to a bar patron. 
15. That, at the Hearing on the instant Motion, defendant 
testified: 
(a) That he had not told Mr. Moffat the identity of the 
bar patron who borrowed his motor vehicle. 
(b) That he did not presently know the whereabouts of 
the bar patron. 
16. That it is not credible defendant would not have told 
Mr. Moffat a bar patron had borrowed his motor vehicle and the 
identity of that patron. 
17. That Mr. Moffat did not expend resources, in 
interviewing the bar witnesses who could place defend^Dt: at the 
bar until 11:45 p.m., is reasonable in view of del{$xj$feZQ 
admission to Mr. Moffat that he departed the bar at that time. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
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18. That there is abundant eyewitness testimony, physical 
evidence and incriminating statements by defendant upon which the 
jury could base its verdict of guilty. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes, as a matter of law, that there is no error or 
impropriety in this matter which had a substantial adverse effect 
upon the rights of defendant and that it is not in the interest 
of justice to grant defendant a new trial, 
DATED this d7 day of a new trial. 
Approved as to form: 
// 
Ma&yt. Corporon 
Counsel for Defendant 
THE HO^I^Ii&^FRANK G\ NOEL 
Third tri-s^ rlct Court Judge 
A* L* /I * OOO23(p£02le 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusion Of Law was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Mary C. Corporon, Counsel for Defendant 
Clifford W. Perry, at 310 South Main Street, Suite 1400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101 on this^gyf day of May, 1994. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CLIFFORD W. PERRY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION 
OF LAW 
Case No. 931901556FS 
Hon. Frank G. Noel 
Defendant's Sentencing, based on a jury conviction for the 
crime of Aggravated Kidnapping, came on before the Court on April 
1, 1994, at 10:30 a.m.. Defendant was present and represented by 
appointed counsel, Mary C. Corporon of Corporon and Williams, 
Salt Lake City, and the State of Utah was represented by Kenneth 
R%.% Updegrove, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney. 
In accordance with §76-5-302(3), Utah Code Annotated, 
Aggravated Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree punishable 
by a term which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5, 
10, or 15 years and which may be for life. Additionally, §76-3-
201(6) (a), Utah Code Annotated states, w [i]f a statute under 
which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three 
000208-CJ;-
stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall '• order 
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imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime." 
Counsel for the State of Utah presented circumstances in 
aggravation and argued for the most severe minimum term. Counsel 
for defendant argued for the least severe minimum term. 
Defendant made a statement in which he denied any involvement in 
the crime for which he was convicted. 
In determining whether a minimum term other than that of 
middle severity shall be imposed, the Court considered the record 
in the case, the Presentence Investigation Report from Adult 
Probation and Parole, the statements at the hearing presented by 
counsel and defendant, and the guidelines referred to in §76-3-
201(6) (e) , Utah Code Annotated. 
Being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the 
following Findings of Fact relative to circumstances in 
aggravation and the Conclusion of Law based thereon: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant has established instances of repetitive 
criminal conduct. 
2. That defendant's criminal conduct has escalated from 
those against property to those against the person. 
3- That the victim was particularly vulnerable as she was 
000209,, , 
approached from behind, at night, while she was ©4 oh^y^ocess of 
placing groceries in her motor vehicle. 
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4. That defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon which 
he held to the throat of the victim. 
5. That defendant continues to deny any involvement in the 
crime even in the face of abundant, credible evidence. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes, as a matter of law, there are circumstances in 
aggravation which justify the imposition of the most severe 
minimum term of 15 years. 
DATED this / ^ day of April, 1994. 
Approved as to form: 
m f / 
MkifyJ C. C^rporon 
C o u n s e l l o r Defendant 
0002.1.0 
